Schumpeter’s empirical democratic theory Cover Image

Schumpeter empirikus demokráciaelmélete. Az állampolgári politikai tudás mint a demokratikus elszámoltathatóság feltétele
Schumpeter’s empirical democratic theory

Author(s): András Szántó
Subject(s): Politics / Political Sciences, Politics, Political Theory
Published by: MTA Politikai Tudományi Intézete
Keywords: Citizens’ political knowledge; accountability; manipulation

Summary/Abstract: One of the most prominent questions of democratic theory is whether citizens are able to competently engage in politics. This article examines the question of citizens’ political knowledge in relation to democratic theory. The research question of this paper is: Are citizens able to hold politicians accountable, according to empirical research? In order to answer my question, I use an analytical framework derived from the Schumpeterian democratic theory whose central claim is that citizens are irrational and politically incompetent, and therefore, they are not able to hold politicians accountable. This article – slightly differently from contemporary literature – considers accountability not only as a retrospective concept, but also as a prospective one which takes citizens’ anticipative capacity into consideration, as the associated components of accountability – citizens’ preferences, leaders’ manipulation and responsiveness – justify a broader scope of the notion. As a final conclusion of the research, I find that the comparison of distinct empirical studies by means of an analytical framework fosters fruitful reflections on democratic theory.

  • Issue Year: XXVII/2018
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 29-52
  • Page Count: 24
  • Language: Hungarian