Reformulating Tichý’s Conception of Bare Individuals Cover Image

Reformulating Tichý’s Conception of Bare Individuals
Reformulating Tichý’s Conception of Bare Individuals

Author(s): Jiří Raclavský
Subject(s): Logic, Analytic Philosophy
Published by: Filozofický ústav SAV
Keywords: Bare particulars; individuals; antiessentialism; properties; intensional logic;

Summary/Abstract: A bare individual was conceived by Tichý as an individual such as if the property the individual instantiates is non-trivial (contingent), it is possible for the individual to lack it (and still be the same individual); and for any trivial property (i.e. property with constant extension) that it cannot lack this kind of property. The exact readings of Tichý’s original formulations of bare individuals are subjected to a detailed analysis to reveal that any of them is refutable by means of Cmorejian objection that there exist contingent properties which are partly essential (i.e. there exists an individual which cannot lack such property). To avoid such (valid) objection, the present paper attempts to rebuild Tichý’s definitions into viable ones.

  • Issue Year: 15/2008
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 143-167
  • Page Count: 25
  • Language: English