Fish – Dworkin debate as an example of dispute about practice of interpretation of law Cover Image

Debata Fish – Dworkin jako przykład sporu o praktykę interpretacji prawa
Fish – Dworkin debate as an example of dispute about practice of interpretation of law

Author(s): Michał Pełka
Subject(s): Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Law
Published by: Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
Keywords: legal interpretation; meaning; Stanley Fish; Ronald Dworkin; Ludwig Wittgenstein

Summary/Abstract: The aim of the article is to critically asses the theories of interpretation developed by two prominent philosophers, namely Stanley Fish and Ronald Dworkin. After first describing and reconstructing their ideas the paper then identifies problems concerning the stance according to which everything in applying law depends on interpretation. The critic is based on the Ludwig’s Wittgenstein remark that there must be grasping the rule (or more broadly a meaning of any word) which is not interpretation, otherwise we end up in regressus ad infinitum fallacy. Paper’s main claim is that although the theory of R. Dworkin is not fully free from defects it has nevertheless more explanation power than the opponent’s propositions.

  • Issue Year: 11/2015
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 86-105
  • Page Count: 20
  • Language: Polish