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Against Lewis on ‘Desire as Belief’
Against Lewis on ‘Desire as Belief’

Author(s): Douglas Ian Campbell
Subject(s): History of Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Special Branches of Philosophy
Published by: Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Keywords: Desire as Belief

Summary/Abstract: David Lewis describes, then attempts to refute, a simple anti-Humean theory of desire he calls ‘Desire as Belief’. Lewis’ critics generally accept that his argument is sound and focus instead on trying to show that its implications are less severe than appearances suggest. In this paper I argue that Lewis’ argument is unsound. I show that it rests on an essential assumption that can be straightforwardly proven false using ideas and principles to which Lewis is himself committed.

  • Issue Year: XI/2017
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 17-28
  • Page Count: 12
  • Language: English