Butler’s Problem from a Rational Agent’s Perspective Cover Image

Problem Butlera z perspektywy racjonalnego sprawcy
Butler’s Problem from a Rational Agent’s Perspective

Author(s): Adam Wierzbicki
Subject(s): Philosophical Traditions, Social Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy
Published by: Uniwersytet Warszawski - Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii, Instytut Filozofii
Keywords: utler’s problem; rational agent; intentional action; motivation; moral judgment

Summary/Abstract: Butler’s problem poses a challenge to philosophical theories of intentional action because it suggests that intentionality attribution is dependent on moral judgement. Experimental results reached so far seem to confirm this thesis. However, the agent described in Butler scenarios seems to lack fundamental rationality, which may distort intuitions about the intentionality of his/her actions. An experimental study described in this work aims to overcome this problem by providing explicit reasons for action. Strength of motivation is also compared with moral judgement as a factor in intentionality attribution. The results of the study suggest that neither explicitly described reasons nor strength of motivation have a significant influence on intentionality attribution in Butler scenarios.

  • Issue Year: 26/2018
  • Issue No: 2 (102)
  • Page Range: 41-54
  • Page Count: 14
  • Language: Polish