ПОЧЕМУ ПАРАДОКС МЕНОНА БОЛЕЕ УПОРЕН, ЧЕМ ЭТО ПРЕДПОЛАГАЕТ РЕШЕНИЕ АРИСТОТЕЛЯ?
WHY MENO’S PARADOX IS MORE STUBBORN THAN ARISTOTLE’S SOLUTION SUGGESTS?
Subject(s): Epistemology, Ancient Philosphy, Analytic Philosophy
Published by: Новосибирский государственный университет
Keywords: Meno’s Paradox; Posterior Analytics; possibility of inquiry; search for knowledge; attitude ascription;
Summary/Abstract: In the present paper, we analyze Aristotle’s solution of Meno’s Paradox in his An. Post. I, 1.71a17–71b8, where he seeks to demonstrate that Plato’s assertion that it is impossible to search for an unknown object is false. We show that such an interpretation of Aristotle’s solution is very generous on his part. We demonstrate that the search in Aristotle’s solution is quite naturally treated as a search for an object that satisfies the search conditions and that this treating of the search in question allows to write down a formally correct notation with the epistemic operators. Nevertheless, this interpretation of Meno’s Paradox solution, despite all its merits, turns out to be defenseless against an alternative that is similar to the original paradox, to wit: if the object to be searched for is fixed, then it is meaningless to search for it; if it is not fixed, then even the realized desire to find such an object will never fix the object that satisfies the search conditions.
- Issue Year: XI/2017
- Issue No: 2
- Page Range: 505-514
- Page Count: 10
- Language: Russian