Komparatystyka na gruncie filozofii Założenia, uprzedzenia i perspektywy
Comparative Studies in Philosophy Assumptions, Prejudices and Perspectives

Summary/Abstract: The paper discusses peculiarity of the comparative method applied in philosophy since 1920s. It presents its basic foundations and objectives, as well as the early and most recent definitions of “comparative philosophy”. The author aims at reconsidering in terms of philosophy both the reasons for bias against this method and its advantages in the context of cross-cultural comparative studies. The crucial question is whether various incommensurate schemata of thought, including these which are determined by distinct cultural milieus, may be the subject of comparison at all. To answer this question, she refers, among others, to Ludwik Fleck’s conception of a socially constructed “thought style” and “the truth”, being completely determined within a thought style. h e author also consults the conceptions of Stanisław Schayer, Daya Krishna, Bimal K. Matilal and Jitendra Nath Mohanty who recommend the comparative method as highly useful for the on-going philosophical debates as long as it is not confined to tracing merely similarities between different intellectual traditions, i.e. analogical ideas and equivalent arguments. What seems to the present author the most valuable philosophical contribution to the comparative studies is the perspective of polilogue suggested by Franz M. Wimmer, and the metacomparative self-reference recognized by Wilhelm Halbfass and Robert W. Smid as precious enhancement and challenge for profound philosophical inquiry as such.

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