Przyczyny (i konsekwencje) niekompletności oraz niewyłączności struktur praw własności współczesnych spółek kapitałowych
Reasons (and consequences) of incompleteness and non-inclusion of property rights structures of contemporary capital companies

Summary/Abstract: The aim of the article is to answer the question: how to explain the situation, when many years of talented managers who have enormous knowledge and experience make decisions leading to the bankruptcy of the enterprise, the crisis of entire national economies and even regions or the entire economic world. The answer to this question requires not only an analysis taking into account the construction of specific institutional solutions, but also a deep transformation of the axioms of the mainstream economics paradigm. To this end, the article states: • analysis of (in)appriopriateness of assumption of the rationality of decisions made, • interpretation (extensions) of the claims of the new institutional economics, • presenting the stages of the evolution of institutional conditions for the exercise of ownership rights (making decisions on how to use scarce resources). The theorems presented in the article as well as formulated extensions to them together with the fact of the deepening incompleteness and non-inclusion of property rights are the cause of uncontrolled apriopriation. Mutual driving opportunistic opportunism, asymmetry of information and limited rationality enable (fuel) “moral hazard”, i.e. the risk of decision-makers unowned on the rights of proprietary (incompatible) decisions (including more risky) with interest (including an acceptable level of risk) of owners authorized under the ownership rights. As a result, it has to lead to a decline in the efficiency of socio-economic systems, bankruptcies of companies that should never fail, crises in the scale of economic sectors, countries and even global crises.

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