The Concept of Self-Identity and Moral Conflicts
The Concept of Self-Identity and Moral Conflicts

Summary/Abstract: This paper examines the concept of self-identity as a factor that influences agents’ choices in moral conflicts. The main questions it concerns itself with are whether there is a connection between self-identity and reasoning in moral dilemmas and, given the strong reasons to believe that such a connection exists, how we should most properly understand self-identity. I examine some of the most notable recent contributions on the topic of personal identity, those of Sandel and Taylor, and find them wanting because of their one-sided interpretation of identity. I follow Rorty and Wong in arguing for a more heterogeneous concept of self-identity, which would respect the various diverse sources of personal identification. After discussing briefly the types and sources of moral conflict, the paper examines two widely accepted accounts of reasoning in moral dilemmas, the position of particularist rationality and the quasi-existentialist position. This is done with reference to the two main issues of interest here, the extent to which these accounts acknowledge the importance of self-identity for moral conflict reasoning, and the plausibility of their conceptions of personal identity. The Aristotelian position of contextual reasoning is deemed unsatisfactory because it does not include considerations of self-identity among the resources for resolving the hard choices, and because it suffers from certain conceptual flaws. The quasi-existentialist approach to reasoning in moral conflicts pays more attention to agents’ self-identifications. However, it is found unconvincing because it focuses solely on one aspect of the agent’s heterogeneous identity, arguing that adopting a holistic view of one’s life requires choosing in line with the kind of person one wants to become. Conversely, this paper argues that agents can maintain the feeling that their choices are connected to one another by consistently choosing in line with any of their diverse identifications.

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