К ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИИ КОММУНИКАТИВНОГО СОЗНАНИЯ. ИНТЕРСУБЪЕКТИВНОСТЬ И СУЖДЕНИЕ
TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF COMMUNICATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS. INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND JUDGMENT

Summary/Abstract: Communication and intersubjectivity are considered as correlative problems of the phenomenology of consciousness. The term “communication” is taken in the narrow sense and refers to already formed communities with relatively independent subjects. Intersubjectivity is understood as a double constitution: the goals and means for their achievements, on the one hand,and their coherence of action, on the other. The source of intersubjectivity and communicative consciousness as a whole is the discriminating ability of consciousness, and above all the ability to distinguish between one’s own and another’s, as well as between what is real and what is unreal.The first difference is correlated with the problem of a common understanding of goals and objectives, the second with efforts for coherence. In this paper, I analyze Husserl’s approach to the problem of intersubjectivity. I show that the concepts of one’s own and others’ must be supplemented by the concept of real and unreal. Criticism of the Husserlian conception focuses on the premise of the early phenomenology of the primacy of perception in relation to judgment and all other modes of consciousness. In this paper judgment is regarded as the primary ability of a person to communicate, to determine the relationship between parts and the whole in search of common solutions and a common understanding, which remain relative and factual also through judgments. I conclude that the difference and correlation of the act of consciousness and meaning is the source of communication; any communication involves internal communication on the type of feedback. Any communication has two levels: (1) communication and (2) communication of communication.

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