Uncertainty and Probability within Utilitarian Theory Cover Image

Uncertainty and Probability within Utilitarian Theory
Uncertainty and Probability within Utilitarian Theory

Author(s): Jonathan Baron
Subject(s): Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Special Branches of Philosophy
Published by: Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Keywords: utilitarianism;ambiguity;probability;expected utility

Summary/Abstract: Probability is a central concept in utilitarian moral theory, almost impossible to do without. I attempt to clarify the role of probability, so that we can be clear about what we are aiming for when we apply utilitarian theory to real cases. I point out the close relationship between utilitarianism and expected-utility theory, a normative standard for individual decision-making. I then argue that the distinction between “ambiguity” and risk is a matter of perception. We do not need this distinction in the theory itself. In order to make this argument I rely on the personalist theory of probability, and I try to show that, within this theory, we do not need to give up completely on the idea that a “true probability” (other than 0 or 1) exists. Finally, I discuss several examples of applied utilitarianism, emphasizing the role of probability in each example: reasonable doubt (in law), the precautionary principle in risk regulation, charity, climate change, and voting.

  • Issue Year: 2017
  • Issue No: 53
  • Page Range: 6-25
  • Page Count: 20
  • Language: English