In Defence of "Belief". A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism Cover Image

In Defence of "Belief". A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism
In Defence of "Belief". A Cognitive Response to Behaviourism, Eliminativism, and Social Constructivism

Author(s): Jonathan A. Lanman
Subject(s): Anthropology, Religion and science , Philosophy of Religion, Cognitive Psychology, Behaviorism
Published by: Филозофски факултет, Универзитет у Београду
Keywords: belief; science of belief; cognitive science;

Summary/Abstract: The cognitive science of religion seeks to explain religious beliefs. Yet "belief" as a term has been criticised by many anthropologists, psychologists, and philosophers. The main criticisms of "belief" are that beliefs are unobservable, that they do not exist, and that the word ‘belief’ is a western construct unsuitable for comparative use. All of these criticisms may seem to render a "science of belief" naïve and mistaken. Utilizing the work of the cognitive sciences, and the philosophical view of functionalism that underlies them, I will offer a minimal definition of belief that will allow for a science of belief and withstand such criticisms.

  • Issue Year: 3/2008
  • Issue No: 3
  • Page Range: 49-62
  • Page Count: 14
  • Language: English