Urban Planning and Design for Terrorism Resilient Cities Cover Image

Urban Planning and Design for Terrorism Resilient Cities
Urban Planning and Design for Terrorism Resilient Cities

Author(s): Irina Matijosaitiene, Ana Petriashvili
Subject(s): Security and defense, Criminology, Rural and urban sociology
Published by: Exeley Inc.
Keywords: CPTED; environmental design; terrorism prevention; urban planning;

Summary/Abstract: The actuality of this research is determined by a significant number of recent terror attacks and their disastrous impacts on urban forms. The target of terror attacks has moved from developing to developed countries. Existing urban polices in most countries do not meet counter terrorism standards. Consequently, implementation of counter-terrorism guidelines while planning safe places has turned into essential factor for the 21st century design. The research comprises identification of environmental design (CPTED) factors as well as spatial urban structures that influence the choice of places for terror attacks. 14 sites with terror attacks and 21 sites without terror attacks were assessed according to the developed CPTED questionnaire. For understanding spatial urban structure 6 cases have been analyzed with space syntax method. The research results reveal that the following CPTED factors are related to the choice of place of terror attacks: Strong separation of private and public activities; Site that has a direct access to the main street; Site that has a multiple entrances and exits; Minimization of vehicle access points to the building; Access to private and public space; Site that has a direct access to the city center; Site is well-used; Redistribution of same functional buildings on the site; Presence of a medical institution nearby the site. According to the results of the automatic regression analysis, the following CPTED factors do the biggest impact on the choice of places for terror attacks: 1) vehicle access points to the buildings are minimized, 2) public and private activities are separated, 3) there are many same functional buildings redistributed in the surrounding area. Descriptive statistics reveal the weakest points on the analyzed sites: 1) public and private activities are not separated, 2) many same functional buildings are not redistributed in the surrounding area, 3) access points to the building are not minimalized, 4) the object is surrounded by an open space, 5) there is no security police presence at the site, and 6) there no minimum required setback distance between the building and site boundaries. After the visual comparison of segment maps of integration, choice, mean depth and connectivity, we have discovered that almost all terror attacks happened on the most globally integrated (R=n) street segments, except Tel Aviv case study. Finally, the recommendations for the elements of site reorganization and the elements of street network reorganization are proposed.

  • Issue Year: 18/2017
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 27-38
  • Page Count: 12
  • Language: English