Етика слободе vs. eтика либералистичког прагматизма
Ethics of Freedom vs. Ethics of Liberal Pragmatism

Summary/Abstract: In this political-philosophical article the concept of ethics of freedom as ethics of revolution and democracy – in contrast to the opposite standpoint of ethics of liberal pragmatism and utilitarianism – is analyzed. Liberal pragmatism has been the dominant model of Western discourse in the second half of the 20th century and in first decades of the 21st century, most notably expressed through philosophical streams of postmodernism and neoliberalism. Moreover, this worldview has been realized in practice and politics of the United States and majority of European countries as well and has, therefore, established itself in the form of a non-questionable entity. Hence the conceptual urgency to approach such a unique situation and to reaffirm the meaning and value of philosophical historical tradition of political ethics from Aristotle to Marx, Arendt and Badiou comes forth. The author, therefore, first and foremost addresses the issue as why is it that – in difference to ethics of freedom – liberal ethics, in final theoretical and practical instance, always already, as is were, refers to capitulation as surrendering to the enemy. Or, in other words, the basic question is what are the substantial reasons for „the par excellence un-ethical moment“ in liberal ethics, signifi ed by the fact of giving up on decisive values such as freedom, equality, justice and dignity – in the name of mere survival. In response to this extraordinary challenge, the philosophical concept of acting from the position of freedom and responsibility (a philosophical position highly relevant to the concept and significance of Modernity en generale) is opposed to either forced and/or arbitrary action in the name of so-called bare life (Agamben’s nuda vita exemplified by homines sacri). Furthermore, this opposition corresponds to the difference between the concepts of subjectivity, possibility and the event, on the one hand, and the sphere of necessity, needs and bare life as such, on the other. In the second part of the article, the relation between normative and prudential reasons is critically expressed through focus on their radical dimensions of principles and arbitrary human action. In turn to the sphere of politics and democracy, reflecting the sense of phronesis, it is further argued that the central category of political subjectivity is the people and that the ground of the political lies in politics of reason. The political, as reason, this way, stands in difference both to common sense and to the practice of politics as techniques (Vernunft vs.Verstand). These two theoretical moments, that is, the role of the people and the role of reason in politics are presented as irreplaceable for comprehending political ethics per se. Moreover, it is beginning from such an understanding that it becomes theoretically plausible to recognize the infinity multiplicity in which ethics of freedom – precisely as ethics of responsibility - emerges as ethics of revolution and democracy.

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