Is Understanding Factive? Unificationism and the History of Science Cover Image

Is Understanding Factive? Unificationism and the History of Science
Is Understanding Factive? Unificationism and the History of Science

Author(s): Sorin Bangu
Subject(s): Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
Published by: Институт по философия и социология при БАН
Keywords: understanding; factivity; unification; explanation

Summary/Abstract: Factivism is the view that understanding why a natural phenomenon takes place must rest exclusively on (approximate) truths. One of the arguments for non-factivism—the opposite view, that falsehoods can play principal roles in producing understanding—relies on our inclination to say that past, false, now superseded but still important scientific theories (such as Newtonian mechanics) do provide understanding. In this paper, my aim is to articulate what I take to be an interesting point that has yet to be discussed: the natural way in which non-factivism fits within the unificationist account of scientific explanation. I contend that unificationism gives non-factivists a better framework to uphold their position. After I show why this is so, toward the end of the paper I will express doubts with regard to the viability of de Regt’s (2015) kind of non-factivism, based on the idea that understanding should be captured in terms of (scientific) skill.

  • Issue Year: IX/2017
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 35-44
  • Page Count: 10
  • Language: English