The Allocative Implications of the Implementation of the Private Supplementary/Parallel Health Insurance in Egoistic, Altruistic, and Envious Societies – an Economic Perspective Cover Image

Alokacyjne konsekwencje wprowadzenia prywatnych dodatkowych/równoległych ubezpieczeń zdrowotnych w społeczeństwach kierujących się egoizmem, altruizmem lub zawiścią – perspektywa ekonomiczna
The Allocative Implications of the Implementation of the Private Supplementary/Parallel Health Insurance in Egoistic, Altruistic, and Envious Societies – an Economic Perspective

Author(s): Christoph Sowada
Subject(s): Philosophy, Social Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy, Health and medicine and law
Published by: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Keywords: social welfare;utility;the model of social optimum;private supplementary health insurance;private parallel health insurance;egoistic society;altruistic society; envious society; John Rawls;Adam Smith

Summary/Abstract: Assessing the implementation of various instruments and solutions in a healthcare system, we cannot limit ourselves to examining their impact on the fulfillment of the criteria of justice and equity alone. Another important social objective is to maximize social welfare under the conditions of the scarcity of resources. The aim of the article is to analyze (using the social optimum economic model) the impact on social welfare of the implementation of private insurance (supplementary or parallel) into the existing system of public security, with a view to the following factors: the reasons for restrictions in the public system (the limitations of real wealth vs. the limitations of financial resources), the assumed forms of the aggregation of individual utilities into the social welfare function (addition, multiplication, Rawlsian function, equal division), and the assumed image of society (a society consisting of selfish, altruistic, or envious individuals).

  • Issue Year: 2017
  • Issue No: 51
  • Page Range: 90-112
  • Page Count: 23
  • Language: Polish