THE NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: FROM CONSENSUS TO ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE
THE NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: FROM CONSENSUS TO ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE

Summary/Abstract: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE CRUCIAL, SCAFFOLDING TOOLS BUILT ON THEFOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW NPT2 ESSENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY. "A WORLDWITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS", PROPOSED BY THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S GOAL FOR A LONGHORIZON AND SERIOUS UNCERTAINTY, EACH STEP REQUIRED BY THE TREATY TO REDUCENUCLEAR DANGERS. THE MAIN OBSTACLE IS THE AMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE TO THE OBLIGATIONSUNDER THE NPT, TO THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. A SIGNAL BOOST FOR THEINSPECTION SYSTEM, EXPORT CONTROLS, STRONG ATTITUDE AGAINST VIOLATING INTERNATIONALREGIME. INCREASING THE NUMBER OF REACTORS WILL BRING AN INCREASE OF NUCLEARMATERIAL FOR BOMBS EVEN IF INTERNATIONAL RULES COULD RESTRICT THE DEVELOPMENT OFTECHNOLOGIES THAT OPTION HEU MEMBER IS NOT LIMITED. CONSTRAINTS AND NONPROLIFERATIONREGIME STIPULATED BY THE NPT RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE BASED ON THECONSENT OF THE MAJORITY OF STATES AND A STRONGER ROLE OF THE IAEA THROUGH INCREASEDPOWERS OF INVESTIGATION THAT CAN BE OBTAINED BASED ON ACCEPTANCE OF ALL MEMBERSTATES. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, INTERNATIONAL REGIM

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