WHY DOES THE MILITARY ENACT A COUP?: AN ANALYSIS OF CIVILIAN–MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN INCOMPLETELY INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES Cover Image

ASKER NEDEN DARBE YAPAR?: KURUMSALLAŞMASINI TAMAMLAYAMAMIŞ DEMOKRASİLERDE SİVİL–ASKER İLİŞKİLERİ ÜZERİNE GENEL BİR DEĞERLENDİRME
WHY DOES THE MILITARY ENACT A COUP?: AN ANALYSIS OF CIVILIAN–MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN INCOMPLETELY INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES

Author(s): Bülent Şener
Subject(s): Politics / Political Sciences, Social Sciences, Civil Society, Public Law, Security and defense, Military policy, Political behavior, Politics and society, Social development, Studies in violence and power, Victimology, Sociology of Politics
Published by: Sage Yayınları
Keywords: Civilian–military relationships; Military; Industrialization; Democracy; Coup;

Summary/Abstract: The fact that the military, one of the means of governments’ superior power of sanction, is kept under civilian control and subject to civilian authority is accepted as one of the key conditions of contemporary democracies. The apolitical position of the military in industrialized Western democracies can be explained by the presence of a liberal-democratic model for civilian military relationships (ignoring the military’s relatively partial effect on foreign policy, national security and defense policies). However, civilian-military relationships are observed to always have the potential to directly and/or indirectly affect politics and governance in incompletely industrialized democracies. This study analyzes the level of and reasons for militaries’ effectiveness on political life in incompletely industrialized or unindustrialized democracies based on the causes of military coups, which represent the peak of military intervention in politics.

  • Issue Year: 8/2016
  • Issue No: 31
  • Page Range: 66-72
  • Page Count: 7
  • Language: Turkish