Modeling of Bilevel Games and Incentives for Sustainable Critical Infrastructure System
Modeling of Bilevel Games and Incentives for Sustainable Critical Infrastructure System

Summary/Abstract: Implementation of sustainable development policy is a complex task and challenge for critical infrastructure management. Players in different levels related to critical infrastructure management try to maximize their own utilities and this process often leads to conflicts due to lack of cooperation, that is, noncooperative games exist in the management process of critical infrastructures. Noncooperative games may evolve to equilibrium state after long-term numerous games and society and individuals have to pay enormous cost to this process. This paper focuses on the games and incentive mechanism in critical infrastructure management. The complicated game relation is analyzed and the bilevel game model is put forward. Game analysis helps us to understand the hidden interests and contradictions behind game problems so as to contribute to basic theory for policy making on sustainable critical infrastructure system. Through scientific design of incentive mechanism, the uncertainty of games can be reduced and the theoretical win-win incentive compatibility models are put forward to improve the sustainability of critical infrastructure system. These models allow us to choose a more efficient way for the development and protection of critical infrastructures.

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