Variations of Moral Responsibility Cover Image

Variácie morálnej zodpovednosti
Variations of Moral Responsibility

Author(s): Ľuboš Rojka
Subject(s): Theology and Religion
Published by: Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci
Keywords: Moral Responsibility; Free will; Accountability; Personal Relations

Summary/Abstract: The traditional understanding of moral responsibility (from Aristotle to Kant) includes libertarian freedom, the existence of which has been questioned since the rise of modern science (D. Hume, J. S. Mill). The positions of certain contemporary philosophers and neuroscientists (such as G. Strawson, D. Pereboom) reinforce this skepticism. Neuroscience as such cannot, however, provide evidence for or against morally significant libertarian freedom, which is based on rational reasons and moral values. Although there are problems with the explanation of libertarian freedom, the reasons for abandoning the merit based view of responsibility appear (thus far) insufficient for the change to be a purely consequentialist understanding. It is rather important to deepen the traditional meaning and complement it with contemporary scientific achievements, when examining accountability in concrete situations of human life and society, and also examine the possible social, legal, and theological implications of adoption of purely consequentialist responsibility.

  • Issue Year: XVIII/2016
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 135-154
  • Page Count: 20
  • Language: Slovak