CLAUSEWITZ VERSUS WOLFOWITZ. IRRECONCILABLE PARADIGMS
CLAUSEWITZ VERSUS WOLFOWITZ. IRRECONCILABLE PARADIGMS

Summary/Abstract: Carl Clausewitz's main book, "On War", suffered from its inception continued misinterpretations and distortions, compounded by the frequent opacity of the text itself. One of the most damaging such misinterpretations has probably been the one suggested by Paul Wolfowitz in the framework of the so-called "Wolfowitz Doctrine". The primary objective of the present note is to demystify the situation and to correct the main points of incoherence, in order to contribute to a more accurate interpretation of Clausewitz's thinking. We identify first the main characteristics of "On War" including its implicit moral dimension, and subsequently examine the main areas of incoherence in Wolfowitz's interpretation, among which the excessively ambitious definition of "minimum objectives" originated in an erroneous understanding of the concept of "Total War". As a result, we see that this latter misinterpretation frontally clashes against what is most likely Clausewitz's main thesis, i.e. War as a Rational act. War is a political act and as such is part of a dynamic in which decisions must be taken considering their likely effects, in order to reach the optimal outcome. Given that armed conflicts invariably produce damaging, undesirable losses, preventing them and limiting their scope and duration are obvious demands of rational decision-making, clearly implied in Clausewitz's work. Limitation of war is thus a desirable, appropriate, necessary and efficient objective, contrary to the Wolfowitz's misinterpretation, which needs urgent correction.

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