Optymalny udział menedżera we własności spółki i koszt długu. Perspektywa teorii agencji
The optimal level of managerial ownership and debt cost. An agency theory perspective

Summary/Abstract: The subject of the paper are the relationships between managerial ownership, price volatility (risk) and debt cost from the perspective of an agency theory. Three strategies are considered: maximizing the managerial wealth, maximizing the equity holders wealth and complying strategy with the corporate social responsibility. It turns out that there is such an optimal level of managerial ownership (different for every firm) that the manager acts according to CSR strategy. This optimal level is the higher the lower is price volatility (risk) or the firm has greater growth prospects. Furthermore risk premium is an increasing function of managerial ownership in the managerial strategy and the decreasing function of it in the CSR strategy.

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