ПРИБЛИЖАВАЊЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ СОЦИЈАЛИСТИЧКОМ ЛАГЕРУ ТОКОМ АРАПСКО-ИЗРАЕЛСКОГ РАТА 1967. ГОДИНЕ
Yugoslavia’s Rapprochement with the Soviet Block During the Arab-Israeli War of 1967

Summary/Abstract: The disastrous defeat of the Arab states in war with Israel in June 1967 and the situation in which these states have found themselves were the best proof of real effectiveness of the non-aligned political orientation and of the scope of cooperation between the countries pursuing that orientation. Since Tito was the main champion of the non-alignment, the impotence of the Arab states to militarily and politically defeat a much weaker adversary showed also the impotence of the policy of which he talked with such enthusiasm during his frequent meetings with leaders from African and Asian regions. If the public denouncement of non-alignment by Arab leaders would lead also to the defi nitive abandoning of that concept in favour of a pragmatic alliance with USSR depended on the fi nal resolution of the crisis in the Middle East. Aware that the struggle for alleviating the dramatic consequences of the Israeli aggression was the struggle for survival of the non-alignment, Tito was willing to undertake radical measures. In order to establish as close cooperation with the Soviet Union as possible with the aim of helping his Arab allies, Yugoslav president made the hard decision to join the periodical meetings of representatives of socialist countries again. Just how big the Yugoslav sacrifice was is best proved by the fact that Tito’s refusal to take part in this form of Soviet block activities was one of the major sources of conflict in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. By taking part at as much as fi ve meetings of representatives of socialist countries devoted to finding solution for the crisis in the Middle East, Yugoslavia was increasingly running afoul of USA accusing it of being behind the Israeli aggression and Israeli intransigence concerning the peace in the Middle East. With their severe anti-American campaign, the Belgrade officials seriously endangered their relations with the country on whose economic and financial support the realization of the economic reform and improvement of the critical economic situation in Yugoslavia depended to a large extent. The effects of Yugoslav aid to the Arab countries partly vindicated the sacrifice that had been made in that context. The Resolution 242 of the Security Council of the UN partly comprised those elements of the solution of the Middle East crisis at which Tito arrived through long and hard negotiations with Arab countries and Moscow officials, but also through marathon personal correspondence with American president Johnson. In that way the Yugoslav leader fortified his position on the non-aligned world and secured larger elbow space for himself in pursuit of his initiative for formation of the non-aligned movement later on.

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