Bitak i kretanje
Being and Motion

Summary/Abstract: The paper deals with the central problems of Aristotle's physics,the relation between physics and meta physics, and the opposition of the classical notion of Being and ontologic historicism in the contemporary philosophy. It is demonstrated that Aristotle's physics as theoretical science is ontology of nature dealing with the system and the mode of the Being of being, having the causes for motion and changes in itself. Furthermore, the relatiom between physics and mathematics .is studied, and the position of the former within theoretic disciplines, distinction between nature and technology, science of four causes, the notion of motion is tha roughly analysed, the relation of motion and time, and the notion of time itself, and finally Aristotle's polemics with Eleaten. In the relation (of physics and metaphysics it is shown that motion as the central phenomenon and onotologic feature of nature finds its place between the mode of Being of possibility and reality, as imperfect or uncomplete reality. Therefore, -the true understanding of the notion Of motion inevitably leads to consideration of metaphysics as the primal philosophy on the primary cause and the beginning of motion, the mode of Being of the primary promoter and its essence as the highest purpose of the Universe. However, Aristotle's ontology of nature is not only historically significant, but also as a final notional elaboration of the classic notion of Being on the trail of Parmenides and Plato, which radically opens the problem of relation of Being and time, revealing its topicallity qn the context of the contemporary philosophy, especially the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger. Finally, the classical and modern notion of Being are strongly confronted by the interpretation of Heidegger's idea of »destruction of the history of ontology« and justification of his criticism of Aristotle's notion 'of time as »vulgar«, painting out the reasons for his later turn to »thought of Being« as event.

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