Analiză şi interpretare în fenomenologia husserliană
Analysis and Interpretation in the Husserlian Phenomenology

Summary/Abstract: Analysis and Interpretation in the Husserlian Phenomenology. In spite of some remarkable (thought partial) contributions, Husserl’s project of (transcendental) phenomenology as universal phenomenology still remains incomplete, and therefore may be questionable both in its fundamental idea – that that phenomenology should encompass all the ontologies (all the a priori sciences) and all the sciences in general in a final foundation - and in its accomplishments. In order to complete this task, I believe that the methodological orientation of phenomenology should be stressed, and that the distinctions operating in this second-order critique must be prolonged till their final consequences. One of the aims of this paper is a methodology guided by the theory of constitution and a more precise correlation between the levels of constitution and the levels of phenomenology. Therefore I propose a two-steps post-preliminary methodological approach, which will clarify the status of phenomenology (in the Husserlian tradition) and release its genuine innovating forces. The first step is that of a sharp distinction, perhaps even a separation, between the level of the phenomenological analyses and the level of the philosophical auto-interpretation of these analyses. This distinction will allow us to discuss the various connections between these two levels in Husserlian phenomenology and to examine the way in which some specific phenomenological analyses require a specific philosophical superstructure. The second step is the elaboration of a typology of phenomenological analyses. The chart of the systematic lines of methodological issues, elaborated by A. Steinbock, will be the starting point of a discussion, which will be oriented to the clarification of the role that the so-called empirical sciences played in the general theory of constitution. The final conclusive part of our paper contains some reflections about the viability of the Husserlian project of phenomenology as a universal philosophy.

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