ВЪРХУ СТАВАНЕТО НА РАННАТА ФИЛОСОФИЯ НА ВИТГЕНЩАЙН
ON THE EMERGENCE OF THE BASIC IDEAS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S EARLY PHILOSOPHY

Summary/Abstract: This paper is an attempt for a logical reconstruction of the emergence of some of the basic ideas of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In its first part, the article shows how the rejection of Russell's view that there are logical objects leads up to the idea of bipolarity and thus to Wittgenstein's most fundamental idea that the conditions under which a proposition can say something about the world are conditions under which it cannot be necessarily true or false. The second part of the paper shows that Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense arises out of the repudiation of Russell's idea that human capability for making well formed propositions rests on the existence of logical experience. In opposition to this idea, Wittgenstein develops out a transcendental view of logic, according to which we cannot practically make mistakes in logic. As a result, his conception of nonsense is not syntactical: philosophical nonsense does not arise out of violation of the rules of logical syntax. The third part of the paper is devoted to the emergence of Wittgenstein's picture theory of propositions. The fourth part argues for the thesis that Wittgenstein's version of logical atomism arise out of his attempt to solve the following problem: How is it possible for a proposition to be a picture of certain situation, if the sub-propositional signs in it stand for compound objects? The paper shows further that Wittgenstein's version of logical atomism presents only a part of the solution. The other part is constituted by his depth theory of language, according to which we are not aware of the logico-linguistic operations we make when we construct the meaningful sentences of our everyday language.

• Details
• Contents