TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF ELECTORAL RULES CHANGE
TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF ELECTORAL RULES CHANGE

Summary/Abstract: Existing accounts of electoral rules change have predominantly focused on countries that have actually implemented such changes, thereby creating problems of selection bias. This paper argues that in order to explain the change of electoral rules, it is insufficient to restrict analysis to cases in which such change has occurred. Rather, variance on the dependent variable is necessary for meaningful accounts of electoral system change. Against this methodological backdrop, this paper uses data on electoral rules to assess the impact of political variables on both the probability and direction of change. Employing a Cox proportional hazard maximum likelihood estimation and a Prais-Winsten-regression model, it is shown that systems using proportional representation are less likely to effect changes than are countries utilizing a majority system. At the same time, majoritarian systems change electoral rules in the direction of more proportionality. The number of veto players has a negative impact on the probability of change, but influences the change to a less proportional direction – to the extent it is taking place at all. Finally, government polarization greatly increases the probability of electoral rules changes. These results are robust to the inclusion of country fixed-effects.

• Details
• Contents