Bolzano on Kant’s Definition of Analyticity – Does it Fall Short of Logical Precision
Bolzano on Kant’s Definition of Analyticity – Does it Fall Short of Logical Precision

Summary/Abstract: My commentary is Kant-friendly and I begin by re-situating the Siebel- Bolzano-Kant discussion on analytic judgments in regard to their history, namely, to Aristotle's predication. I focus on Siebel-Bolzano's objections that Kant's analytic judgments (i) have a definiens permitting too broad an interpretation, and (ii) that the definiens is too narrow. I re-examine Kant's use of 'covertly' and 'identity of concepts' and argue pace Mark Siebel that Kant's analytic judgments make explicit the shared content of subject and predicate. I then re-examine Kant and Bolzano's notion of (essential) distinctive feature (Merkmal) discussed by Siebel in the context of the ‘contained in’/’contained under’ issue, and show that Kant’s analytic judgments are nominal definitions.

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