Разривът между "аналитична" и "континентална" философия: структурни особености и генезис
The divide between 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophy: Structural specificities and genesis

Summary/Abstract: In this paper, I attempt to shed some light on the origin of the ‘analytic-continental’ divide in Western philosophy. I argue that it is essentially related to two important lines of opposition in post-Kantian philosophy, namely (1) between scientifi c and non-scientifi c, and (2) naturalist and non-naturalist philosophizing. The fi rst line of opposition is a natural corollary of the Kantian revolution against the traditional, metaphysically oriented philosophy. According to Kant and his followers, (1) philosophy can be intellectually signifi cant only if it is scientifi c, and (2) it can be scientifi c only if it turns its back on the ontological questions about the principles of reality as a whole and the nature of human life. As a reaction to both the Kantian and the traditional paradigm of philosophizing, there emerged the movement of the philosophy of life; its proponents rejected the view that philosophy should be ‘scientifi c’ in order to have cultural signifi - cance. The opposition between naturalist and non-naturalist tendencies of thinking is characteristic of any epoch in the history of Western philosophy. The paper briefl y explains the different forms which this opposition takes in ontology, epistemology and practical philosophy. Notably, most of the scientifi cally oriented philosophers from Kant up to Husserl were anti-naturalists in philosophy. Thus, the opposition between scientifi c and non-scientifi c philosophy did not coincide with the opposition between naturalist and non-naturalist philosophy. This started to change when it became clear that the attempts of Husserl and his disciples to put philosophy on the secure path of a (phenomenological) science failed. The hermeneutic turn in German philosophy, initiated and completed by Heidegger and Gadamer, led to a certain convergence between non-scientifi c and non-naturalist ways of philosophizing in ‘Continental’ philosophy. This created the divide between the ‘Continental’ and the analytically minded philosophers, and especially between the former and the logical positivists who took natural sciences as a paradigm for genuine knowledge of reality. While Heidegger and his followers were hostile toward scientism and naturalism in philosophy, most of the analytic philosophers explicitly embraced the view that only scientifi c and naturalist philosophy is good philosophy.

• Details
• Contents