LES DEEP FAKES DANS LA STRATÉGIE MILITAIRE, UN NOUVEL OUTIL DE LA MASKIROVKA ?
DEEPFAKES IN MILITARY STRATEGY: A NEW TOOL FOR MASKIROVKA?

Summary/Abstract: Deepfakes, produced through artificial intelligence, are becoming tactical and strategic instruments in military communication. By falsifying the voice, image or identity of political leaders, commanders or soldiers, they extend older practices of deception, from Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to the Russian doctrine of maskirovka. Unlike ordinary fake news, deepfakes rely on audio-visual embodiment. Their persuasive force comes from the apparent presence of an authoritative speaker. They therefore combine disinformation, credibility, plausibility and speed. In the military field, this speed is decisive: a false message that may be debunked in hours in political life can cause immediate operational damage during combat. The text identifies several military uses: disrupting enemy command, weakening morale, misleading the adversary about operational intentions, discrediting official orders, provoking escalation through false-flag narratives, and influencing civilian support for war. Deepfakes also raise new problems in machine-to-machine communication, especially identification systems, drone control and signal spoofing. Recent conflicts provide several examples: the fake video of President Zelensky calling for surrender in March 2022, Russian disinformation after the Crocus City Hall attack, Iranian fake television broadcasts in the Gulf, the Russian Doppelgänger operation, forged statements by American officials, and fabricated videos involving Putin or the Philippines. These cases show that deepfakes function as psychological operations within broader information warfare. The central issue is no longer only technical detection, since AI makes falsification increasingly difficult to identify. The decisive question becomes plausibility: how quickly military actors can assess whether a message fits the operational context, the source, and previous discourse. Deepfakes create a new cognitive fog of war. Drones may reduce visual uncertainty on the battlefield, but manipulated narratives increase cognitive uncertainty. In the OODA loop, the “Orient” phase becomes more fragile. Deepfakes therefore belong to cognitive warfare: they seek to disturb perception, trust, decision-making and command cohesion.

• Details
• Contents