La metafísica como opción epistémica y ontológica: el debate entre metafísica del ser y personalismo integral
La metafísica como opción epistémica y ontológica: el debate entre metafísica del ser y personalismo integral

Summary/Abstract: This article examines the relationship between classical metaphysics and integral personalism from the perspective of the notion of metaphysics as an epistemic option. Contemporary personalism has often criticized Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysics for allegedly reducing the person to an impersonal ontological framework structured by abstract categories. However, this critique frequently rests on the assumption that metaphysics is identical with a historically determined conceptual system. Against this view, the present study argues that metaphysics should be understood more fundamentally as the reflective articulation of the principle of intelligibility from which reality is interpreted. From this standpoint, integral personalism does not abandon metaphysics but implicitly adopts a different ontological starting point: the primacy of the person. The debate between Thomistic metaphysics and personalism thus appears not as a confrontation between metaphysics and post-metaphysics, but as an intra-metaphysical dispute about the most adequate ontological foundation for understanding reality. Finally, drawing on Étienne Gilson’s interpretation of the actus essendi, the article argues that the metaphysics of being offers a framework capable of accounting for the uniqueness of the person without dissolving it into an impersonal ontology.

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