Slipping and Sliding Between Formalities and Informalities: Lobbying, Interest Groups, and Democratic Governance in Georgia
Slipping and Sliding Between Formalities and Informalities: Lobbying, Interest Groups, and Democratic Governance in Georgia

Summary/Abstract: This article examines the complex interplay between formal regulatory frameworks and informal political practices through the lens of lobbying in Georgia. As a pioneer among post-Soviet states with its 1998 Law on Lobbying Activities,Georgia presents an instructive case study for analyzing the challenges of institutionalizing transparent interest representation in transitional democracies.Through a synthesis of neo-institutional theory, elite analysis, and comparative policy examination, this study explores the relationship between imported formal institutions and established informal norms. The analysis moves beyond empirical case data to engage in a theoretical and desk-research based investigation of howformal lobbying mechanisms, designed to ensure transparency and accountability,can remain underutilized or bypassed in political cultures where influence is traditionally mediated through personal networks and informal channels. By situating Georgia’s experience within broader scholarly debates on post-Soviet democratization,institutional development, and hybrid governance, the paper examines the systemic conditions that can lead to differences between legal design and political practice. It concludes with a discussion of the implications for democratic consolidation and offers a framework for considering how formal and informal systems of influence might be aligned to strengthen governance.

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