تغيّر الاجتهاد عند الحنفية: الإمام محمد أنموذجًا
The Change of Ijtihad in the Ḥanafi School: The Case of Imam Muḥammad

Summary/Abstract: This scholarly article explores the phenomenon of juristic reversal (rujūʿ ʿan al-ijtihād) within a single school of Islamic law, with particular focus on the Ḥanafī madhhab and the prominent jurist Imām Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805). The study aims to explore the features of the evolution of juristic reasoning in Imam Muhammad’s thought by analyzing the instances in which he revised his earlier opinions, thereby demonstrating the methodological and usul-based maturity such revisions reveal within the Hanafi school. The study is structured in two main sections. The first offers a conceptual and theoretical analysis of juristic reversal, assessing its legitimacy from a legal-epistemological perspective and identifying key factors that lead to the evolution or modification of a scholar’s ijtihād. It also investigates the authoritative status of Imām Muḥammad within the Ḥanafī tradition, emphasizing his pivotal role in codifying and disseminating the school’s legal doctrine. While many jurists have demonstrated development or refinement in their legal reasoning, Imām Muḥammad stands out due to three defining features: his recognition as one of Abū Ḥanīfa’s (d. 150/767)) two foremost disciples; his central role in formalizing Ḥanafī jurisprudence; and his judicial experience, which enabled him to implement legal theory in real-world contexts. These combined qualifications render him a model figure through whom the phenomenon of juristic reversal can be explored in both depth and scope. The second section adopts an empirical approach, presenting selected examples where Imām Muḥammad demonstrably revised his earlier legal positions. The analysis draws primarily on authoritative Ḥanafī sources—namely al-Sarakhsī’s (d. 483/1090) al-Mabsūṭ, al-Kāsānī’s (d. 587/1191) Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ, and al-Marghīnānī’s (d. 593/1197) al-Hidāya—chosen for their doctrinal reliability and representative status within the madhhab. The study follows an inductive method, tracing the rationales behind these reversals, whether prompted by new textual evidence, shifting socio-legal contexts, or refined interpretative insight. Rather than indicating any flaw or hesitation in reasoning, these reversals are expressions of higher juristic principles such as istiḥsān (juristic preference), ʿurf (custom), and maqāṣid al-sharīʿa (legal objectives). In conclusion, the Ḥanafī school thus demonstrates a purposeful flexibility that reconciles textual fidelity with contextual responsiveness. In light of ongoing transformations and emerging challenges, this dynamic juristic legacy offers a compelling model for reengagement—affirming the continued relevance and vitality of classical legal methodology in addressing modern realities, legal transformations, and evolving societal norms.

• Details
• Contents