David Hume’un Teleolojik Argüman Eleştirisinin Eleştirisi
A Critique of David Hume’s Critique of the Teleological Argument

Summary/Abstract: Purpose: This study aims to demonstrate that, although David Hume’s criticisms of the teleological argument (the argument from design) in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion are often presented in philosophical literature as having a conclusive force capable of dismissing the argument, these critiques, while formidable, rest on debatable assumptions. To this end, the study also examines how methodological differences between the historical form of the teleological argument and its contemporary variants—particularly those based on "fine-tuning"—alter the scope of Hume’s critiques. Method: Employing a qualitative research methodology, this study utilizes the secondary literature on Hume’s primary text as its data source. Comprehensive literature reviews of theses, articles, and books were conducted across national and international databases. Given the scarcity of studies directly focusing on a critique of Hume's teleological objections, the textual analysis was rigorously deepened from a critical perspective. For data analysis, descriptive and conceptual content analyses were used in conjunction to reconstruct Hume’s argumentative frameworks, premise–conclusion relationships, and alternative explanatory burdens (such as probability, explanatory power, and simplicity). Findings: The findings reveal that Hume’s critiques do not entirely refute the teleological argument: (i) the analogy critique loses its efficacy in the face of modern fine-tuning and probabilistic inference approaches; (ii) the "multiple designer" hypothesis is a speculative extension that lacks an empirical basis; (iii) the objection from evil or defective design pertains to a separate debate concerning the moral attributes of the designer rather than the core inference of a designer's existence; and (iv) Hume’s scepticism provides a methodological catalyst for the evolution of teleological arguments into more refined forms. Conclusion: The study concludes that Hume’s critiques should be read not as a definitive rejection within contemporary philosophy of religion, but as a critical threshold that transforms the argument. This reading offers a balanced contribution to the literature by intersecting with contemporary discourses on the science–religion relationship, modes of explanation, and probabilistic reasoning. For future research, it is suggested that systematic comparisons with Hume’s contemporaries (Reid, Beattie, Campbell) be expanded; that the fine-tuning argument be evaluated through alternative probability models (e.g., the Bayesian framework); and that the problem of evil be distinguished from design-independent moral-theological debates.

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