THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES THROUGH DIGITAL MEANS
THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES THROUGH DIGITAL MEANS

Summary/Abstract: This article examines the constitutional and human rights implications of digitalization in criminal procedure, arguing that the deployment of data-driven tools and artificial intelligence in criminal justice does not constitute a sphere of constitutional exceptionalism but demands the strict—and in some contexts heightened—application of established fundamental rights safeguards, including legality, proportionality, legal certainty, protection of the essential core of rights, and human dignity. Drawing on a four-scenario analytical framework derived from constitutional scholarship, the article assesses how digitalization simultaneously expands access to justice and generates novel forms of rights interference through surveillance, algorithmic profiling, and automated decision-making. It examines the doctrinal significance of "fourth-generation rights" as a normative category responding to technologically mediated threats to privacy, personal autonomy, and informational self-determination, and argues that these must be operationalised through concrete procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings. The article further addresses the structural dimension of the digital divide, contending that exclusion from digital infrastructure constitutes a rights-relevant inequality that triggers positive state obligations concerning accessibility, digital literacy, and inclusive system design. In this context, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (EU AI Act) is assessed as a normative reference point that translates constitutional requirements of proportionality, transparency, human oversight, and contestability into enforceable compliance standards for high-risk AI systems deployed in law enforcement and criminal justice. The article concludes that the legitimacy of digital criminal procedure depends on a rights-based equilibrium in which technological capability remains subordinate to constitutional justification and procedural fairness, and that digital inclusion must be treated as a constitutional precondition for the effective enjoyment of fundamental rights—not merely as a policy aspiration.

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