DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT THE NEXUS BETWEEN EARNING MANAGEMENT AND INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY? EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAM
DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT THE NEXUS BETWEEN EARNING MANAGEMENT AND INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY? EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAM

Summary/Abstract: This research explores how earnings management (EM) influences investment efficiency (IE) in Vietnamese non-financial companies from 2009 to 2022 while also examining the moderating effects of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on this relationship. IE is measured based on the residual models of Richardson (2006) and Huang (2020), while EM is proxied by accrual-based and real earnings management measures following Kothari et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006), this study indicates that EM negatively affects IE, however, CG mechanisms have mixed effects on this relationship. Particularly, larger and more independent boards tend to mitigate the effect of EM on IE, whereas CEO duality significantly amplifies this negative relationship. These findings highlight the critical role of CG in shaping how EM translates into real investment outcomes and offer important implications for governance reforms aimed at improving capital allocation efficiency in emerging markets.

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