Hatred as an Act of Will. An Aristotelian-Thomistic Grounding for a Definition of Hateful Speech
Hatred as an Act of Will. An Aristotelian-Thomistic Grounding for a Definition of Hateful Speech

Summary/Abstract: Hateful speech is a problem that bothers contemporary societies, and the lack of clear and coherent theoretical foundations contributes to problematic misconceptions. In particular, the understanding of hatred as a mere emotion is too narrow to encompass all instances of hateful language. In this paper, we draw on the Aristotelian-Thomistic account, proposed by the Lublin School of Philosophy and Sędłak, to provide an ethical framework to ground a definition of hateful speech. We argue that the problems with viewing hatred as a mere emotion disappear once it is seen as an act that involves both sensory and rational faculties. With this approach, we engage one of the central debates in hate speech scholarship, which concerns the question whether its harm resides in the act itself or in its consequences. Such a framework, built upon the Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology and Anscombe’s account of intention, allows us to address the challenge hateful speech poses for contemporary societies.

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