PROTECTING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE BALTIC SEA: LESSONS FROM THE BALTICCONNECTOR, ESTLINK 2, AND YI PENG 3 INCIDENTS
PROTECTING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE BALTIC SEA: LESSONS FROM THE BALTICCONNECTOR, ESTLINK 2, AND YI PENG 3 INCIDENTS

Summary/Abstract: This article is written based on the author’s dissertation1 , where he examined the vulnerability, attribution challenges, and resilience of the critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) in the Baltic Sea, using the Balticconnector, Yi Peng 3, and EstLink 2 incidents as case studies. Since the Nord Stream pipeline damage in 2022, the Baltic Sea region has seen a growing number of “accidents” damaging CUI. These events illustrate the growing realisation that CUI is vulnerable to hostile sabotage, whether these Baltic instances were accidents or not. Using a qualitative, comparative case study approach that combines process tracing, document analysis, and expert interviews, the study examines whether Russia was responsible for these incidents and what lessons can NATO states draw to better protect CUI. It finds that although Russia’s motives and capabilities cannot be dismissed, conclusive attribution remains elusive. The cases highlight gaps in the international law that limit enforcement in exclusive economic zones, difficulties in proving intent, and the risk that uncertainty may embolden probing behaviour by state or state-linked actors. They also show that redundancy and preparedness have so far absorbed isolated disruptions but may not withstand instances of sustained or coordinated sabotage. The author argues that CUI protection should be treated as a strategic priority, requiring layered measures of legal reform, improved surveillance and attribution, credible enforcement, and coordinated investment in redundancy and resilience. By framing the seabed as a contested security domain, the study contributes to debates on hybrid warfare and offers a baseline for policymakers confronting emerging threats to CUI.

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