CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU’S POLICY. QUASI NON-ALIGNMENT, ANTI-SOVIETISM AND NEO-STALINISM
CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU’S POLICY. QUASI NON-ALIGNMENT, ANTI-SOVIETISM AND NEO-STALINISM

Summary/Abstract: This short analysis attempts to find and highlight the most important reasons that determined the deterioration of the international imagine of the communist regime from Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Romania. Although after 1968 – the year when the Romanian leader publicly condemned Czechoslovakia’s invasion by the Red Army –, Romania’s image in the Western countries was excellent, during the ’80s the whole capital of sympathy completely disappeared. Nicolae Ceaușescu’s anti-Soviet foreign policy made him a so-called “spoiled child” of the West. In 1989, the Romanian dictator remained the only Stalinist leader from European countries, paradoxically an anti-Soviet Stalinist leader. In my opinion there were three very important events that determined the irreversible degradation of the regime’s image abroad: Helsinki Final Act in 1975; General Ion Mihai Pacepa’s (vice-leader of Foreign Information Department of Romanian Intelligence) run to the USA and last but not the least, Mikhail Gorbachev’s election as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (CPSU) I started from the hypothesis that these three moments were somehow decisive for Ceaușescu’s decline in the eyes of his own people and mainly in international relations. From methodological point of view I tried to explain briefly how and in what measure the three mentioned events and their consequences changed maybe irreversibly the image of Romanian dictator mainly abroad. I tried also to make a short comparison between Ceaușescu’s situation in 1968 and his position in the 1980’s. I strived to identify the main reason for which the popularity level of Ceaușescu’s regime decreased so much. In the year 1968, in August, Romanian leader was at the apogee of his popularity in Romania and in international relations as well. Due to his courageous attitude towards Kremlin, the Western powers perceived somehow Romanian leader as a kind of a new Iosip Broz Tito. We could identify a paradox concerning Ceaușescu’s policy. Even though an anti-Soviet leader until the end in his foreign policy, internally, the Romanian leader turned out to be a fervent Stalinist. During 1980’s the most draconian measures were implemented because the dictator intended to pay all the external debt of the Romanian state. In this way, he wanted to affirm Romania’s independence in international affairs. Unfortunately the costs and the sacrifices of the Romanian population were huge. For the international deterioration of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s „regime”, I have to take into consideration the international context in the late 1980’s, the improvement of the bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington and, as a consequence, the end of the ideological conflict. The Cold War will be over soon. The regional circumstances in Central and Eastern Europe are also very important and I must take them into account. Kremlin had decided to replace Brezhnev’s doctrine of the limited sovereignty with so-called Sinatra Doctrine. Thus, the countries from Soviet sphere were able to choose their own ways and to build their own destinies. The end of the Cold War and refolutions from Central and Eastern Europe made impossible the survival of the last Stalinist regime. The paper also attempted to distinguish a few elements of continuity in Nicolae Ceaușescu’s foreign policy (mainly regarding USSR-Romania relations), unlike in his domestic policy. In this respect one can speak about a few elements of discontinuity. Romanian foreign policy position could be called quasi non-alignment or extended autonomy.

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