ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIBBENTROP-MOLOTOV PACT AND THE VIENNA DIKTAT IN ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS (1941-1944)
ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIBBENTROP-MOLOTOV PACT AND THE VIENNA DIKTAT IN ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS (1941-1944)

Summary/Abstract: This study examines the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (1939) and the Vienna Diktat (1940) on Anglo-Soviet relations from 1941 to 1944, focusing on Britain’s reluctant recognition of Soviet territorial expansions in Eastern Europe. Initially, Britain resisted legitimizing Soviet annexations (e.g., Bessarabia, the Baltics) to uphold the Atlantic Charter’s principles. However, wartime necessity – particularly after Germany’s invasion of the USSR in June 1941 – compelled Britain to tacitly accept Stalin’s demands to secure Soviet cooperation. Key moments include Ambassador Cripps’ failed 1940-41 efforts to detach the USSR from Germany by offering concessions, and Foreign Secretary Eden’s 1941-42 negotiations, where Stalin insisted on post-war Soviet dominance over Romania and Finland. Despite US opposition, Britain’s 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty avoided explicit territorial recognition but signalled acquiescence to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. By 1944, Britain fully aligned with Soviet post-war plans, including Romania’s subordination, as seen in the “percentages agreement”. The study highlights Britain’s pragmatic shift from moral resistance to realpolitik, underscoring its declining power and the USSR’s rising hegemony in post-war Europe.

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