EPISTEMIC VINDICATION, TRUTHLIKENESS AND CREDENCE: DEFENDING THE UNIFIED APPROACH Cover Image

EPISTEMIC VINDICATION, TRUTHLIKENESS AND CREDENCE: DEFENDING THE UNIFIED APPROACH
EPISTEMIC VINDICATION, TRUTHLIKENESS AND CREDENCE: DEFENDING THE UNIFIED APPROACH

Author(s): Tudor Mărginean
Subject(s): Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Epistemology, Logic, Analytic Philosophy
Published by: Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai
Keywords: truthlikeness; probabilism; Brier score; credence; epistemic accuracy;

Summary/Abstract: There are two main approaches used to evaluate someone’s epistemic accuracy. On one hand, we have the approach that evaluates the truthlikeness of some propositions and orders them by their closeness to truth. On the other hand, we can look at someone’s probability assignments and then calculate the accuracy using the Brier score. Recently, Oddie tried to show that these two methods are in tension, because a measure that obeys probabilism will fail to hold Proximity. I argue that the Unified Approach can be saved and, moreover, has some important advantages over the isolated Truthlikeness.

  • Issue Year: 71/2026
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 101-115
  • Page Count: 15
  • Language: English
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