DZIAŁACZE PARTYJNI I LOJALNI EKSPERCI. RELACJE WŁADZY I ADMINISTRACJI GOSPODARCZEJ PRL
PARTY ACTIVISTS AND LOYAL EXPERTS. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES AND THE ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

Summary/Abstract: The article examines the formal and actual power of the government and administration of the Polish People's Republic in the state economy and the relations between the administration and party committees. It describes economic ministers by examining their education, experience, and political influence. Additionally, the article analyses the connections between different power centres in the context of investment and financial decisions. The role of state administration in economic management is also discussed, particularly through the lens of agency theory and information asymmetry. The analysis is based on statistical data and examples of relations within the administration as testified by materials from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, the Planning Commission, and selected provincial committees of the Polish United Workers' Party. The archival material was supplemented with transcripts of the Sejm sessions and legal acts. The participants' memories of the processes described shaped the informal perspectives. The model of the loyal expert complemented the agency structure, at least at the level of economic ministries. One of the reasons for this was the limited political significance of the ministries. The heads of economic ministries were not the highest authorities in the agency structure. A growing share of university graduates among plant directors was noted. The government and administration had a significant advantage over other centres of power due to their access to information, which they utilised during the planning tender process. Observations from individual investments and social relations within factories were reported to party committees, while associations and ministries gathered statistics. Ministers who were members of the Political Bureau were better informed about current issues in their respective fields than other members of the Bureau. Additionally, plant directors possessed both an information and a competence advantage over representatives of party committees at the plants.

• Details
• Contents