Comparative Analysis of the Decision-Making Process in the Bulgarian People’s Army and Yugoslav People’s Army During the Second Half of the Twentieth Century
Comparative Analysis of the Decision-Making Process in the Bulgarian People’s Army and Yugoslav People’s Army During the Second Half of the Twentieth Century

Summary/Abstract: The article recreates the main issues related to the historical overview of the decision-making process in the Bulgarian People’s Army (BPA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) in the second half of the twentieth century. After a brief review in historical terms of the two analysed armed forces from the Balkan Peninsula and their peculiarities in the probative period, the features of the planning and organisation of combat have been synthesized first in the BPA, and then in the YPA. A key point in the scientific development is the conducted qualitative comparative analysis of the two decision-making processes, which represents the results in relation to the object of the study, namely the way in which the tactical unit commanders organize the battle (operation on tactical level of command and control). The scientific investigation proves, despite the similarity of the researched procedure in the two armies, that there are significant differences in the methodology, used by Bulgarian and Yugoslavian leaders preparing for the combat actions. The manuscript ends with drawn conclusions and generalizations regarding the correlation and diversity of the discussed process in the two Balkan armies, which is actually really important in the military affair sphere in the Cold War period.

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