Принцип незалежності судової влади у світлі практики Суду ЄС та ЄСПЛ: досвід Польщі
The Principle of Judicial Independence in the Scope of the Practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights: the Experience of Poland

Summary/Abstract: The issue of defining the content of the constitutional principle of judicial independence remains highly relevant both in the context of national law enforcement and at the level of European adjudication. Increased attention from European Union institutions to the question of judicial independence has contributed to the development of interpretative practice concerning this principle, particularly in cases involving states where systemic deviations from its classical understanding have been identified. The aim of this study is to identify and systematize differences in the approaches of European courts to assessing violations of judicial independence, as well as to analyse the methods of legal interpretation applied in their respective decisions. To achieve this objective, the study conducts a detailed review of the texts of key judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights addressing issues related to judicial appointments, guarantees of judicial independence, the institutional autonomy of judicial bodies, and effective judicial protection. The empirical (source) basis of the research consists of the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights in which approaches to the interpretation of the principle of judicial independence have been developed. Based on the analysis of these judicial decisions, differences in the interpretative approaches adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights have been identified. The Court of Justice of the European Union primarily focuses on the functional aspect of judicial independence in the context of the application of European Union law and compliance with the requirements of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, whereas the European Court of Human Rights develops a broader, systemic approach, assessing judicial independence as an element of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Particular attention is paid to differences in the standard of proof, the depth of institutional analysis, and the role of the national constitutional context in the case law of both courts. The article substantiates the thesis that these differences lead to divergent legal consequences for Member States and affect the effectiveness of protecting the principle of judicial independence at the European level. It is concluded that a comparative analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights not only provides a deeper understanding of the nature of contemporary threats to judicial independence, but also reveals the limits and potential of European mechanisms for safeguarding the rule of law in the context of constitutional transformations in the Member States.

• Details
• Contents