Autocratization within Ethnic-Power Sharing: Bosnia and Herzegovina between Formal Democracy and Authoritarian Practices
Autocratization within Ethnic-Power Sharing: Bosnia and Herzegovina between Formal Democracy and Authoritarian Practices

Summary/Abstract: Nearly three decades after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) continues to experience democratic stagnation, institutional dysfunction, and deepening autocratization. This paper examines how the post-war institutional design of BiH, anchored in rigid ethnic power sharing, has enabled authoritarian practices within a formally democratic framework. The aim is to trace the interplay between consociational arrangement, state weakness, and the strategies of ethnonational elites in fostering autocratization. Methodologically, the study combines theoretical insights from literature on autocratization and competitive authoritarianism with a qualitative within-case analysis of BiH, drawing on institutionalist perspectives, democracy indices (V-Dem, Freedom House, BTI), and empirical examples from 2006 onward. The findings show that mechanisms originally intended as safeguards for ethnic groups (such as extensive veto rights, decentralized authority, and segmented electoral arenas) have been systematically instrumentalized for patronage, obstruction, and the erosion of democratic norms. Consequently, autocratization in BiH does not manifest as a centralized authoritarian regime but rather as parallel subnational competitive authoritarianisms embedded within the consociational framework. These dynamics demonstrate that in weak post-conflict states, corporate power-sharing and ethno-territorial autonomy can invert their intended purpose, transforming safeguards into drivers of authoritarian entrenchment and thereby undermining both institutional functionality and democratic legitimacy.

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