İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARAT SUBAYI R. J. MAXWELL’İN RAPORLARINDA 1877-1878 OSMANLI RUS HARBİ TUNA CEPHESİ SEFERBERLİĞİ
MOBILIZATION OF THE DANUBE FRONT DURING THE 1877-1878 RUSSO-TURKISH WAR IN THE REPORTS OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE OFFICER R. J. MAXWELL

Summary/Abstract: This study aims to contribute to the field by examining the largely neglected mobilization phase of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 through the reports of British intelligence officer Major Robert James Maxwell. Military historiography in Turkey has long remained within a limited framework due to the lack of analytical approaches, difficulties in accessing military archives and the tendency to focus on battle narratives rather than the strategic dimensions of warfare. Similar problems can be seen in the literatüre of 1877-1878 War. Most of the studies focused on the Plevna Battle while essential issues to understand war such as mobilization, concentration, supply and logistics have drawn little attention. To address this gap, the article compares Maxwell’s report with Ottoman, British and Russian sources. The study discusses the changes in mobilization and argues that the key factor of the war’s outcome was not the number of soldiers but how effectively they mobilized, directed and managed. In this context, the study underlines the Ottomans weaknesses in strategic planning and command, which prevented them from using its sources efficiently. In contrast, the Russian success in logistics, supply, planning, definition of objective and concentration, supported by its pre-war reforms, is considered as the main reason behind its early advances and success in the war.

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