Beyond Linz: Institutional Safeguards and the Viability of Presidentialism in Africa
Beyond Linz: Institutional Safeguards and the Viability of Presidentialism in Africa

Summary/Abstract: The debate on presidentialism and its impact on democratic stability has been a central concern in political science, particularly following Juan José Linz’s seminal work on the perils of presidentialism. Linz contends that the separation of powers in presidential systems engenders democratic instability, primarily due to political rigidity, dual legitimacy, and zero-sum electoral politics. While many scholars support Linz’s argument, others critique it as overly simplistic, emphasizing institutional weaknesses rather than inherent flaws in presidential systems. This study engages with these scholarly debates by highlighting divergent perspectives on the relationship between presidentialism and democratic consolidation. This study moves beyond the abstract argument of whether presidentialism is inherently stable or fragile to discussing its viability in postcolonial Africa and whether external factors, such as weak institutions, play a more decisive role. And it concludes that presidentialism is not inherently detrimental to democracy, but requires robust institutional safeguards.

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