Turkish-American and NATO Relations After the Embargo: Türkiye’s Strategic Position in Light of NSSM 227, CIA, and NATO Defense Planning Documents (1974-1980)
Turkish-American and NATO Relations After the Embargo: Türkiye’s Strategic Position in Light of NSSM 227, CIA, and NATO Defense Planning Documents (1974-1980)

Summary/Abstract: This study examines the effects of the American arms embargo imposed after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation on Turkish-American relations and Türkiye’s strategic position within NATO. The objective is to reassess the widely cited “crisis of confidence” thesis—often built on secondary interpretations—through primary documents, namely the U.S.’s National Security Council’s National Security Study Memorandum 227 (NSSM 227) report (1975), the CIA’s Interagency Memorandum (1975), and NATO Defense Planning documents (1973–1982). The research is based on systematic archival work conducted in 2023–2024, using U.S. presidential archives, CIA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) releases, and NATO archives. The findings demonstrate that while Washington depicted Türkiye as an “unreliable but indispensable” ally, Brussels focused on military and economic deficiencies, framing Türkiye as a dependent yet critical partner. Ultimately, the study argues that Türkiye’s position shifted from a “special ally” to a “compulsory partner” and that the embargo significantly amplified concerns about NATO’s southern flank deterrence.

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