Interoperabilitatea platformelor digitale și abuzul de poziţie dominantă: lecţiile din cauza Google/Android Auto
Interoperability of Digital Platforms and Abuse of Dominant Position: Lessons from the Google/Android Auto Case

Summary/Abstract: This article examines the landmark judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Google/Android Auto case (C-233/23), which significantly redefines the legal framework governing refusals to ensure interoperability in digital markets. Departing from the traditional indispensability standard established in Bronner and IMS Health, the Court held that a refusal by a dominant undertaking to grant interoperability can constitute an abuse of a dominant position even where the platform is not strictly indispensable for the operation of the third-party product, provided the refusal has potential restrictive effects on competition and reduces consumer choice. The analysis critically explores the new criteria established by the Court, including the assessment of the platform’s purpose, the impact on effective and potential competition, and the interests of consumers. It further discusses the objective justifications available to dominant undertakings, such as security risks, technical impossibility, and the absence of an existing template, as well as the obligation to develop interoperability solutions within a reasonable timeframe, against appropriate remuneration. The article highlights the tension between protecting dynamic competition and preserving innovation incentives, particularly in the context of the Digital Markets Act, and concludes that this jurisprudence heralds a more flexible, but also more demanding approach to regulating digital ecosystems in the European Union.

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