2. Prezumţiile în arhitectura logicii juridice
2. Presumptions in the architecture of legal logic

Summary/Abstract: In this article I aim to capture the complexity of presumptions through the prism of their double logical legal dimension: both as premises for various inferences used by the legislator, parties and court alike, and as evidence in the procedural game. This duality of presumptions requires, on the one hand, the analysis of the components of classical formal logic, relevant in detecting the rational core of presumptions in their understanding and application, and, on the other hand, the elements of probability logic involved in their concrete evaluation and justification. The compass of the analysis therefore covers the role of inferences in the construction and application of presumptions, and their conditions and effects as evidence. The article provides stable anchors in support of the idea that such analysis is essential in judicial decision making, balancing certainty and adaptability through the dual use of inference and probability assessment. Relevant in this last point are Bayes' Theorem and the dynamics of conditional probabilities illustrated by hypothetical examples and elements of judicial practice. Far from exhausting the content of legal logic in the matter of presumptions, the paper merely outlines the architecture of legal logic applicable to the matter, the lines of force, arguing that legal logic is an essential tool for understanding and applying presumptions, despite the reluctance in judicial practice and doctrine to apply rigid formalisms of a mathematical or symbolic nature, and, rather, to adopt and justify decisions on an intuitive, implicit logical basis.

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